

Gurkha Post, on the 19th May, the capture and destruction of Tagu on the 20th May, the capture and occupation of Palla on 26th May, and various minor operations, kept the enemy so busy that they only attacked Kangma on the 7th June, when they were repulsed, and made one other threat on our communications which by that time had been strengthened. Meanwhile another period of intense strain fell on the Supply and Transport Services, as not only had the advanced troops to be supplied, but larger accumulations had to be laid in at Phari, Tuna, Kala Tso and Kangma to facilitate an advance in force to Lhasa if necessary. The weather on the upper plateau had improved, but early rains in the Teesta Valley and an outbreak of cholera (fortunately localised), handicapped the lower section of our line.

The Supply and Transport Services, however, responded nobly to the call made on them for a special effort, and by the middle of June the necessary reserve of 18,000 maunds of supplies had been collected and distributed.

5. The third phase of the operations was the advance in force to Gyangtse and thence to Lhasa, during the period from 13th June till 3rd August. As soon as the additional reinforcements asked for (1½ battalions Infantry, and 8 guns and details) arrived in Chumbi, the advance on Gyangtse begun, the force moving in two columns. The first column comprised 125 Mounted Infantry, 8 guns, 1,450 infantry, 950 followers and 2,200 animals; the second consisted of 500 fighting men, 1,200 followers and 1,800 animals, and included the supply train.

The leading column reached Kangma on the 22nd of June and was there joined by the second column next day.

The enemy had by this time collected against us a force of 16,000 men. They had several small cannon, some 30 jingals and wall pieces, and 800 breech-loaders, while the balance were armed with matchlocks. They were distributed as follows:—At Gyangtse 8,000; at Niani, holding the Kangma-Gyangtse road, 800; at Niru, 15 miles east of Kangma and guarding the Kangma-Ralung road, 800; at Gubshi, 18 miles east of Gyangtse and guarding the Lhasa road, 1,200; at Tsechen, guarding the Gyangtse-Shigatse road, 1,200, with a support of 2,500 men at Dongtse. All these bodies held strongly fortified positions, and a further force of 1,500 was at or *en route* to the Kharola, which was also fortified. Thus, though the enemy had a great numerical superiority, they were so distributed as to facilitate their being dealt with in detail.

On the 23rd June I detailed 500 infantry with 2 guns and 50 mounted troops to attack Niru. The enemy, however, hastily withdrew and retired for the most part over the Sela instead of to Ralung. The same day I occupied the outlet of the Zamdang Gorge with 250 men who entrenched themselves.

On the 24th the first-named detachment rejoined, and on the 25th June the march on Gyangtse was resumed and the enemy located in a strong position at Niani where they had been reinforced from Gyangtse. On the 26th June the enemy were driven from Niani after a sharp action, in which a portion of Lieutenant-Colonel Brander's force participated, and Gyangtse was reached on the same day. I now determined to drive the enemy from their Tsechen position and so open the fertile Shigatse valley to our foraging parties, an operation which was successfully

carried out on the 28th June, with surprisingly little loss, thanks to the thorough co-operation between the artillery and infantry.

Their defeat at Tsechen led the enemy's force at Dongtse to hastily retire on Shigatse, while some 2,000 of the enemy also deserted from Gyangtse Jong. I had moved my camp to the south bank of the Nyang Chu on the 28th, and commenced a bridge west of the town near an advanced post Lieutenant-Colonel Brander had established the same day, with a view to inducing the enemy to believe our main attack on the Jong would come from the north-west. Meanwhile the enemy sent in flags of truce, and futile negotiations, followed with the Mission until noon the 5th July, when active operations were resumed. That afternoon we directed a strong demonstration against the north-west face of the enemy's defences, to confirm them in the idea that this was the direction of our main attack. Our troops pushed in and occupied some houses within 300 yards of the enemy's line, held their positions until after dark, and then having lighted picquet fires, silently withdrew to camp. At midnight the troops intended for the real attack on the south-east side of the Jong moved silently off and were in their allotted positions at 3.30 A.M. on the 6th July. The enemy had been misled by our demonstration the previous day and when our three assaulting columns advanced against the town at 4 A.M. they effected an entrance with comparative ease, and had so strongly established themselves by the time the enemy could draw men from their north-west defences that the enemy's persistent efforts to dislodge them were completely frustrated.

Late in the afternoon, the south-west curtain of the Jong was breached and the Jong carried by assault by Gurkhas and Fusiliers supported by a concentrated fire of every gun and maxim. Though the Monastery and greater part of the town were still in their hands, the enemy fled during the night mostly towards Shigatse, and their force at Gobshi retired hastily on the Karo la.

A flying column despatched down the Shigatse valley for supplies, found both Dongtse and Penam Jong evacuated, and returned to Gyangtse with large stores of grain and meal. An advance on Lhasa was now imperative, and on the 14th July the Lhasa column consisting of 200 Mounted Infantry, 1,900 Infantry and Sappers, 8 guns and 6 Maxims, with 2,000 followers and 3,900 animals carrying 23 days' rations marched out. A garrison of 8 companies Infantry, 50 Mounted Infantry, and four guns was left to hold Gyangtse. On the 16th, after marching in daily rain, the Lhasa column reached Ralung and ascertained the Karo la (16,600 feet) was strongly fortified and held.

On the 18th July, the Karo la was forced after comparatively slight resistance, the bulk of the enemy having fled during the night. The engagement was chiefly remarkable for the great altitude at which our troops had to fight (18,500 feet) and the retreat of the enemy over a glacier and snow field.

On the 19th July, Nangartse Jong was occupied without resistance, and some loss inflicted on the retiring enemy.

The weather still continued inclement so I gave the column a day's halt and then continued the advance. Pete Jong was occupied on the 21st without resistance, and from all sources we learned the enemy were fleeing before us and